The political economy analysis of the Egyptian tariff structure allows for the identification of two sets of highly protected sectors. Over-protected industries are defined as those with actual tariffs at least 25 percent higher than what is predicted by the political economy variables used in the analysis. The political determinants we use can be divided into two groups: the lobbying and counter-lobbying forces. First, the lobbying strength of specific capital in each sector is proxied by the degree of industry concentration, the labor-capital ratio, and the import penetration ratio. Second, counterlobbying in factor or input markets is proxied by wage level, degree of processing in the industry, and degree of intra-industry trade. Using this political economy methodology, we identify two sets of products: six products where tariff cuts will not be politically 4 costly and six where it will be politically costly. In both cases, lowering tariffs will improve resource allocation and efficiency in the industries involved.
This paper provides a political economy analysis of the difficulties of liberalizing tariffs in Egypt in general and in its specific industries. The theoretical and empirical models are presented and results are discussed. We also explore the potential effects of the EuroMed agreement for Egypt.
The political economy analysis of the Egyptian tariff structure allows for the identification of two sets of highly protected sectors. Over-protected industries are defined as those with actual tariffs at least 25 percent higher than what is predicted by the political economy variables used in the analysis. The political determinants we use can be divided into two groups: the lobbying and counter-lobbying forces. First, the lobbying strength of specific capital in each sector is proxied by the degree of industry concentration, the labor-capital ratio, and the import penetration ratio. Second, counterlobbying in factor or input markets is proxied by wage level, degree of processing in the industry, and degree of intra-industry trade. Using this political economy methodology, we identify two sets of products: six products where tariff cuts will not be politically
Introduction
Egyptian economic history has been influenced by the import-substitution industrialization approach to development, dating back to Jamal Abdel Nasser's PanArabic and socialist movement of the 1950s. Two major waves of liberalizations have marked the government's efforts to rationalize and modernize the economy -the Infitah This paper provides a political economy analysis of the difficulties of liberalizing tariffs in the general economy and in specific industries. After a brief overview of the Egyptian past and present economic policy in section one, we discuss the theoretical basis for our analysis and present the empirical model and results in section two. Section three identifies over-protected and under-protected industries, including an analysis as to whether the EU-Egypt FTA agreement will help mitigate some of the resistance to liberalization. We discuss alternative liberalization scenarios in section four. Section five concludes.
I. Political economy of Egypt

A. History in brief
Egyptian economic history is characterized by import-substitution industrialization approach to development, dating back to Gamal Abdel Nasser's Pan-Arabic and socialist movement of the 1950s. Nasser gave a sense of populist entitlement to the people, while allowing for a large public sector, a command economy and strong unions. Anwar Sadat's Infitah (the opening) sought to roll back some of Nasser's legacy. The Infitah succeeded in fostering "a bourgeoisie thriving on international connections and tertiary activities, but it stimulated little investment in production industries or for export (Hinnebusch, 1993, pg. 160 )".
In the early 1990s, Hosni Mubarak undertook structural adjustment -assisted by the IMF and World Bank -and went beyond the Infitah in an attempt to transform the institutional structure of the economy. In its economic rendition, deepening the Infitah was an attempt to integrate Egypt into the world market by unifying the exchange rate, raising interest rates to internationally competitive levels, and ending the import prohibitions and oil subsidies progressively. Trade liberalization would help free the local market from public sector dominance and partially correct economic incentives for production and exports.
The Egyptian bourgeoisie was ambivalent over the trade reforms. Private industrialists who benefited from privileged connections (trade monopolies, domestic market domination) with the public sector opposed reforms. Import agents and businessmen with an eye on public assets to be privatized supported them (Hinnebusch, 1993) .
Lengthy debates between the government, public manufactures, and the private sector contributed to a slow pace of reform. Furthermore, the government, still wanted to achieve promotion of production and export of semi-finished products by providing domestic machinery and intermediate goods. This policy duality slowed the pace of liberalization (Weiss & Wurzel, 1998) .
Trade and stabilization policies launched in 1991 did not bring about the expected output response. While the economy was stabilized, growth remained sluggish. Majd (1995) notes that this may be due to a number of elements. In addition to macroeconomic stability, political stability and adequate institutional and infrastructural supports enhance trade reform credibility. Also, empirical evidence from developing countries suggests that governments need to ensure that market contestability is not affected by potential rent seeking, lobbying or vested interests. Springborg (1999) argues that Egypt's economy still has the remnants of its economic history. One interpretation is that some political and economic elites may have sought to keep their advantages by resisting reforms. This type of behavior may be revealed in their attempt at perpetuating tariff barriers to protect monopolized domestic markets or their lobbying efforts for over-valued currency in order to ensure continued access to cheap imports. 1 Springborg's analysis seems to be supported by the developments of the last decade in trade. The Egyptian foreign trade trends are characterized by a heavy reliance on rentier, as opposed to productive, income. For instance, in 1998 rentier income totaled US $10-11 B, consisting of tolls on the Suez Canal (US $2 B); tourism (US$ 3 B); workers' remittances (US $ 2.5 B); foreign aid (US $1 B); and petroleum (US $1.5 B). In the same year non-oil commodity exports earnings summed up to some US $3B, equally divided between primary products and manufacturing 2 . 1 Springborg, 1999, pg. 27 2 Information from Berger and Checchi consulting companies, January 2000, "Trade and Investment Trends and Prospects in Egypt". Report prepared for USAID.
B. As things stand
B.1. Tariff Analysis
Egypt's trade liberalization has led to more than 50 percent decrease in tariffs. However, the trade regime still does not compare well with many countries that have undertaken sweeping trade reforms. Egypt's tariff regime is characterized by a high average tariff, an extremely high dispersion of tariff levels across tariff lines, and a significant amount of tariff escalation. In 1999, Egypt's nominal average tariff rates was 27.4 percent, including the 3-4 percent customs and other surcharge 3 . While generally comparable to the Moroccan and Tunisian average tariff rates (respectively 25 and 33.6 percent), the Egyptian rate largely surpasses that of Argentina (13.5 percent in 1998) and Chile (11 percent). It also compares poorly to the 14 percent average of all IMF members. Egypt's average import-weighted tariff is 13.8 percent, comparable to Argentina's ( 12.9%) but higher than Chile's (10.9%) , Malaysia's (9.4 %) and Philippines'(9.3%). These differences points to the relatively restrictive tariff structure in Egypt(see appendix A). indicates a high degree of dispersion in its tariff structure (the coefficient of variation is equal to 4.5 compared to the traditional 0.5 level).
4
The most salient feature of Egypt's tariff structure is the degree of tariff escalation, i.e., tariffs are higher for fully-processed products than raw materials or semi-processed products. In 1999, the average tariff on products in the first stage of processing was 14.3 percent; in the second stage 21.4 percent and in the third stage 35.6 percent
5
. Tariff escalation can be found across all Egyptian industries, with the exception of Fabricated Metal and Machinery (see Figure 3 in Appendix A). While not particular to specific industries, tariff escalation is rather significant in Textile and Leather, Wood and Wooden Furniture and Basic Metal. Given the discussion above, it is not surprising that most distorting tariffs (Table 2) are found in the manufacturing sectors, where the tariff range is between 0-3000 (0-135 excluding alcoholic beverages). schedule). However excluding alcoholic beverages, the average tariff remains at a high of 21.5 percent.
Including the 2-3 percent surcharge, the average tariff is close to 25 percent. 4 Again, this is partly influenced by the tariff peaks for alcoholic beverages; but as shown in Table 4 , there are several other sectors where the within sector coefficient of variation is above the traditional 0.5 level. 5 The classification of different stages of production was calculated according to WTO filter used in Trade Policy Reviews.
II. Political economy of tariffs: determining politically optimal tariffs
High tariffs appear consistent with the political economy equilibrium in Egypt. To assess the "political" cost that tariff reductions may induce, one first needs to understand what determines the Egyptian tariff structure. We follow the empirical literature on endogenous tariff formation through industry lobbying. .
General predictions
The predictions of the correlates of expected cross-sectoral variations in tariff protection are presented below. Other things equal, the level of protection received by an industry is higher 8 :
• the higher the level of industry concentration.
9
This captures free-riding incentives à la
Olson.
6 For a recent review of the empirical and theoretical literature, see Rodrik (1995) . For recent empirical literature applied to the region see Rama (1994) . For alternative approaches to the theory of endogenous protection, based on "social insurance" for example, see Hillman (1989) . 7 Due to data constraint, the analysis focuses on manufacturing exclusively. 8 All these results are also well documented in the empirical literature on endogenous tariff formation, see Rodrik (1995) . However, both the theoretical and empirical results are somewhat partial equilibrium, since they do not necessarily account for the simultaneity bias. For an empirical study that accounts for the simultaneity bias between imports and tariffs, see Trefler (1993) . This aspect is neglected in the empirical section.
• the lower the import penetration ratio.
10
The rationale for this is that the lower the import penetration ratio, the lower the relative weight of consumers compared to producers in the government's objective function.
11
• the higher the degree of processing of the product
12
. Here we capture lobbying rivalry. If sector j purchases goods from sector i then sector j will counter-lobby any increase in sector i's level of protection. Thus, the higher the share of sector i production that is purchased by other sectors the smaller the endogenous tariff.
Therefore, as long as consumers are not organized, consumer goods receive ceteris paribus higher levels of protection than intermediate goods.
• the higher the labor/capital ratio
13
. Cadot et al. (1997) show that tariffs are higher in sectors where the share of capital remuneration in value added is large, after introducing lobbying rivalry on the labor market. A higher labor/capital ratio ceteris paribus has two opposing effects on the share of capital remuneration in value added.
On one hand, the direct effect tends to reduce it, as a higher labor/capital ratio obviously implies a smaller capital/labor ratio. On the other hand, a higher labor/capital ratio implies a higher marginal productivity of capital relatively to labor which in turn raises the share of capital remuneration in value added. Under suitably general conditions, it can then be shown that the latter effect dominates the former if not well-founded in empirical measures of industry concentration as shown by Hillman (1991) and Long and Soubeyran (1996) . For ambiguous evidence on the relation between protection and industry concentration see Baldwin (1984) . For a review of the literature on seller concentration and protection, see Bilal (1995) . However, there is a general presumption that industry concentration leads to higher levels of protection and this is confirmed in the empirical section. 10 see Grossman and Helpman, 1994 for a theoretical justification. This result has been generally challenged on empirical grounds, as discussed by Rodrik (1995) . For empirical examples, see Anderson (1980) or Finger and Harrison (1994) . 11 To see this, note that m y c y y c y = − = − ( )/ / 1 where m are imports (or net imports), c is consumption and y the level of production. 12 see Cadot et al., 1997 for a theoretical justification and Ray, 1991 or Marvel and Ray, 1983 for empirical examples. 13 for empirical evidence, see e.g., Finger and Harrison, 1994 and Rodrik, 1995. the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor is smaller than 1 (which is a generally accepted value in the empirical literature).
14
• the smaller the share of intra-industry trade 15 . Cadot et al. (1997) argue that the larger the share of intra-industry trade in total trade, the larger the elasticity of import demand for goods produced in the domestic economy, and thus following Ramsey pricing rule, the lower the tariff (since the efficiency costs of a tariff is relatively large compared to the producers gain in that case). Marvel and Ray (1987) suggest an alternative explanation based on intermediate inputs counter-lobbying: they argue that intra-industry trade essentially arises among producers (purchase of intermediate goods), and as producers are more concentrated than consumers, they tend to be more efficient in combating protectionist pressures. Finally, Levy (1997) argues that an increase in intra-industry trade benefits all agents whereas an increase in inter-industry trade has the usual Stolper-Samuelson redistributive effects and therefore are subject to more conflict and higher lobbying pressures.
If one assumes that labor markets are segmented in the sense that labor is better conceived as being mobile across a particular group of industries rather than across the economy as a whole, then it can be shown that the level of protection received by an industry is higher:
• the lower the equilibrium wage in this sector 16 . Cadot et al. (1997) show that the optimal endogenous tariff of each sector is positively related to the share of specific capital in total sales. Then, the larger the wage in sector I (once we control for output 14 In a two factor sector, the share of capital remuneration in value added is given by:
1, where r is capital wage, k is the amount of capital, w is labor wage and l is the amount of labor. Then
where σ is the elasticity of substitution between labor and capital. And the right hand side is larger than zero if σ < 1 . Note that the empirical estimation of the elasticities of substitution between labor and capital generally yield values below one. 15 for theoretical explanations see Cadot et al., 1997 , Levy, 1997 and Marvel and Ray, 1987 ; for an empirical example, see Marvel and Ray, 1987. and labor/capital ratios), the smaller the share of capital in total sales, and therefore the smaller the incentives to lobby in the political game.
Empirical specification
The Egyptian tariff equation is given by:
, 0 log log where subscript i refers to the 81 industry aggregation of the ISIC-4 digit manufacturing classification; i T is tariff in sector i, α s are parameters,
PV , is the political economy variable k in sector i, µ i is the error term. The political-economy variables were listed above. The construction and expected signs of these variables are given in the annex.
We face a potential heteroscedasticity problem as we use grouped data where the number of elements per line differ from 1 line to 524 ( see table 3 ). This is due to the fact that tariffs are generally set at the tariff line level (8-digit of the HS system) and that the political-economy analysis is carried out at the industry level. To correct this potential heteroscedasticity we weight each observation by the square root of the number of tariff lines in each industry (Dickens, 1990) . The estimation method is OLS with a White correction to obtain robust standard errors.
Estimation results for the above equation for Egypt's manufacturing sector are reported in the table 3 below. The overall fit of the equation is relatively good and variables tend to have the expected sign except for intra-industry trade and labor-capital ratio. The reason for this is probably due to the fact that Egypt tariff structure tends to highly protect capital intensive sectors. 
III. Identification of over-protected and under-protected industries
The political-economy analysis also allows us to identify over-protected and underprotected industries. The Indicator of over-protection (I i ) determined by the ratio of the actual tariff level (t i ) the fitted value ( i t ) from the above estimation:
If the ratio is larger than 1 then this indicates that the sector has a higher tariff level than what would have been predicted from the above estimation. 18 We identify over-protected industries is those where the value of the actual tariff is 25 percent higher than the value predicted by the political economy variables described. This corresponds to all industries for which the Indicator in the third column of table 3 is above 1.25. This is the case for 27 of the 81 sectors (or 33 percent of all sectors) of the Moreover, all these sectors consist of fullyprocessed products (and some semi-processed in Motor vehicles), which implies that tariff reductions will also reduce the extent of tariff escalation in Egypt's tariff structure (see Table 4 ), contributing to efficiency gains due to resource reallocation.
With the exception of Tyres and Tubes, these over-protected sectors are not involved in export activities 20 (see Table 4 ). The high levels of protection are distorting the allocation of resources to these activities in which Egypt has apparently a low comparative advantage. Reallocating resources from these sectors to the rest of the economy by lowering tariffs in these over-protected sectors should therefore, not only have a low political cost, but also provide a boost on exports of products in which Egypt has a comparative advantage.
A. Where will the tariff reform hurt?
The political-economy analysis also allows us to identify industries where tariffs are close to or below their political optimum. We define these industries as those where the tariff fitted value obtained (see appendix) is not larger than the actual applied tariff (i.e., the indicator in the first column of Table 4 is smaller than 1).
The more under-protected sectors (i.e., those for which the indicator in Table 4 These are all sectors in which the applied average tariff is below 10 percent and therefore should not be affected by a tariff reduction that reduces the highest tariffs.
However, there are eight sectors that have applied average tariffs above 30 percent and for which the value of the political indicator in Table 4 is below 1. These are: Bakery products (3117), Cocoa, chocolate and sugar confectionery (3119), Knitting mills (3213), Leather products (3233), Footwear (3240), Wooden and cane containers (3312), Soap, cleaning preparations, perfumes (3523), Pottery, china, earthenware (3610). These are sectors in which tariff reduction will be politically costly and where a longer adjustment period may be necessary. Note that all these sectors consist of fully-processed products with the exception of Cocoa, chocolate and sugar confectionery which also includes semi-processed products (see Table 5 ).
However, two of these sectors export a significant amount of their domestic production (Leather, 81 percent and Pottery 67 percent). Tariff reductions in these sectors will probably lead to within industry reallocation of resources from inefficient producers that sell within the domestic market to more efficient producers that aim towards foreign markets. Given that within industry reallocation implies relatively low adjustment costs, the adjustment period for these sectors could be shorter. 20 where 15 percent of domestic production is exported. Also see table 5.
The remaining six sectors show little export activities (with the exception perhaps of Wooden and Cane containers). Reducing tariffs in these sectors (in the medium run to allow for costly adjustment) will lead to reallocation of resources into more efficient sectors with a more outward oriented production structure.
B. Can the EU-Med agreement help ease the pain? B.1 The EU-Egypt Agreement -General Description
The full EU-Egypt agreement was not available for a review at the time of this analysis, but available information suggests that it emulates the recent Tunisia and Morocco agreements in tariff reduction schedule and preferential access.
21
The new EU-Egypt agreement is to achieve a free trade area by 2010. It will ensure a deepening of the trade liberalization beyond Egypt's Uruguay Round commitments, albeit on a preferential basis. It will also provide improved market access for Egyptian exporters to its largest trade partner.
The agreement will provide preferential access to the EU market for most Egyptian industrial exports (these later constitute 60% of the Egyptian exports to the EU). The EU may provide duty free access to some industrial exports while duties on EU exports of most industrial products to Egypt are expected to be phased out over 12 years.
21 Both Tunisia's and Morocco's EU agreement only covers industrial products 21 . Tunisia already has free access for most of its industrial exports to the EU since a 1976 agreement -except for textile in which it has not filled its quota anyway.
The Tunisian agreement opens up, over 12 years, all tariffs and non-tariff barriers to industrial imports from EU, subject to a measure of safeguard. QRs and tariffs were immediately removed for intermediate inputs and capital goods (equipment goods). There is a delayed liberalization of the consumer goods imports. This has caused increased ERP, leading to further distortions in the economy. In light of this development, The IMF has suggested advancing the remaining phases of trade tariff dismantling. This is to avert any further mis-allocation of resources that later would need to be re-deployed at economic and political cost.
The first phase of trade liberalization (tariff reduction) in line with the EU-Moroccan agreement went into effect on July 1, 1999. This first stage, as in the Tunisian case, involves reducing tariffs on industrial and intermediate goods. Tariffs will be eliminated on raw material and capital goods within the first 5 years of the implementation of the agreement. This liberalization pattern will imply an increase in effective protection at first.
Tariff concessions on a seasonal basis are accorded on some agricultural products, based on reference prices and quotas. The concessions range between 40-80 percent of the EU CET for mainly complementary products to EU agricultural production: dates, mangoes, onions, potatoes, citrus fruits. The agreement is non-reciprocal. EU exports face MFN tariffs.
The schedule of tariff reductions is launched three years after the agreement goes into effect. It will take 20 years after signature to be fully implemented. The tariff reduction schedule, especially as it applies to industrial products, is geared to remove tariff on raw and intermediate inputs and capital goods, but delay liberalization of consumer goods imports.
More specifically, the schedule of tariff reduction consists of three broad lists:
(i) agricultural commodities, for which the two parties have agreed to quotas.
(ii) Ago-Processed Products, which were not considered as industrial goods and for which the EU currently apply tariffs.
(a) Products presently subject to tariffs of 1-5 percent (i.e. bones, bird skin and feather, maltose, cocoa, etc.) will have face zero tariffs starting in the first year the agreement goes into effect.
(b) Products presently subject to 20-30 percent tariffs (i.e. milk, vegetable extracts, etc.) will see the maximum rates reduced by 15 percent to 22.5 percent from year 3 and within 3 years.
(c ) Finally, products presently subject to 30-40 percent tariffs (i.e. biscuits, based items, preserved vegetables and fruits, etc.), will see the maximum rates reduced by 25 percent to 30 percent from year 3 and within 3 years.
(ii) Industrial imports which are grouped into four categories: primary, intermediate and final (consumer) goods, and a last category deals with cars only. 
B.2 Implications of Egypt-EU Agreement for Egypt's External Tariffs
This agreement will have important consequences for Egypt as the EU represents 42 percent of its export market and 39 percent of its imports.
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The EU-Egypt tariff reduction schedule discussed above, similar to the Tunisian and Moroccan agreements, is expected to increase the effective rates of protection, peaking during the eighth year after signing of the agreement, and then declining to zero by the 19 th year. This will lead to inefficient re-deployment of economic resources towards more protected final industries in the medium term. It may also make liberalization in the later years more politically difficult for the Egyptian government as some industries become accustomed to higher medirum term rates of effective protection.
More worrisome, given Egypt's existing high tariff level, dispersion, and escalation, the EU-Egypt agreement is expected to create trade diversion if not accompanied by external tariff liberalization. Egyptian tariff will no longer protect Egyptian producers exclusively, but also European exporters to the Egyptian market. This will induce income redistribution from the government's tariff revenue to European exporters. To avoid trade 22 The restrictiveness of the EU rules of origin will play be an important factor for this to hold true. diversion, trade liberalization with Europe should be accompanied by external tariff reductions.
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Reductions of external tariffs will also enhance Egypt's export competitiveness as it decreases the anti-export bias embedded in the high tariffs. Duty-free access to the European market should compensate Egyptian exporters to Europe for any domestic loss of protection, especially in semi-and fully-processed goods. In 23 of the 96 sectors reported in table 4 exports to Europe represents more than 50 percent of total exports.
Note that in 16 of these 23 sectors the product degree of processing is above 2 which indicates that these products are either semi-or fully-processed goods. These are also products in which Egypt tends to have high tariffs.
Duty free access to the Egyptian market granted to European exporters will intensify competition in Egypt as it reduces the level of "protection" granted to Egyptian importers.
24
In 38 of the 96 sectors reported in table 4, European imports represent more than 50 percent of total Egyptian imports. More importantly, in 33 of these 38 sectors the level of processing is above 2, which suggest that these goods are semi-or fullyprocessed products. In Egypt these products tend to have high tariffs.
To a small country, an important attraction of Free Trade Areas (FTA) with large partners is that its producers are protected by the large partners' tariffs within the FTA zone. If the small country also lowers its external tariffs, its consumers and users of imported intermediate products can enjoy lower price products at home. This logic is behind the lowering of external tariffs in Chile while the government was multiplying its preferential trade agreements with partners in the Western Hemisphere and beyond. Duty free access to the European market will make the reallocation of resources from highly protected sectors into export oriented sectors less costly (as long as the agreement accounts for Egypt's export interests and rules of origin that are not too restrictive). In the two sectors (Leather and Pottery), where tariff reductions may be politically costly, but where there is a strong outward orientation, duty free access to the European market will compensate for any tariff reductions in the domestic market. This is especially true for Pottery where almost 50 percent of domestic production is already exported to Europe.
Increased competition from European exporters in Egypt's market in some products will make any Egyptian external tariff irrelevant as European producers may flood the market with their products under the agreement. This is again true for Leather products where imports from Europe represented 63 percent of local production in 1998 and for Pottery where the corresponding figure is 35 percent.
IV. Other Regional Agreements and their Potential Impact
Traditionally, trade has not been very large with regional partners, though there are potential medium term gains from improved access to regional markets. Egypt has started to respond to this opportunity and has engaged in a multitude of regional and bilateral agreements in the late 90s. The two most notable regional ones -aside from the EU-Med -are Greater Arab Free-Trade Area (GAFTA) and Common Market of the Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA).
By joining COMESA and GAFTA, Egypt has committed itself to greater regional trade liberalization. GAFTA was signed in 1997 and aims to expand intra-regional trade by 25 The previous Minister of Industry in Morocco, Hasan Abouyoub, has mentioned that external trade liberalization would not have been feasible without first entering into a free trade agreement with the reducing customs duties by 10 percent annually starting in January 1998. Seasonal quotas on agricultural exports will be applied until all tariffs are phased out. COMESA was created in 1993. Egypt joined in June 1998. COMESA's goal is to have a common external tariff (CET) by 2004, with zero percent tariff for capital goods, five for raw material, 15 for intermediate inputs and 30 for final goods. Egypt will need to undertake further liberalization to fit within this framework as its present tariff schedule shows peaks beyond the proposed CET, even after excluding "sensitive" products such as beverages and motor vehicles. There are opportunities for Egyptian exporters, especially to COMESA countries.
21.
The bevy of bilateral agreements, such as the one recently signed with a number of Arab countries and the ones being negotiated with the US and Turkey will enhance trade liberalization while raising concerns regarding possible trade diversion and increased complexity of the Egyptian trade regime (i.e., the "spaghetti-bowl" phenomenon linked to overlapping regional trade agreements with different regimes regarding rules of origin).
V. Conclusions
The political economy analysis of the Egyptian tariff structure allows the identification of two set of highly protected sectors: those in which tariff reductions are going to be politically difficult (bakery products, cocoa, chocolate and sugar confectionary, knitting mills, leather products, footwear, wooden and cane containers, soap, cleaning preparations, perfumes, pottery, china and earthenware ) and those in which tariff cuts will not be politically costly ( motor vehicles, soft drinks, tobacco, musical instruments, tyres and tubes, electrical appliances and Alcoholic beverages). The first group could be given a longer adjustment period. For the second group, tariffs cuts could be more speedy. In both cases tariff cuts would improve resource allocation and efficiency within the industries.
European Union (see World Bank (2000), "Trade blocs", Washington DC).
The prospects of a Free Trade Area with Europe should also help reduce tariffs in sectors
where a high share of production is exported or imported from Europe. If products are exported to Europe, the potential free access to the European market should more than compensate for any tariff reductions in the local market. On the other hand, if products are heavily imported from Europe, the preferential access for European exporters will tend to significantly increase their presence in the Egyptian market. This in turn will reduce the "protective" aspect of external tariffs in these sectors due to the added competition The full implementation of the structure of tariff reductions embedded within the EUEgypt agreement will take 19 years. This structure leads to increased effective rates of protection for the first eight years of its implementation, added economic distortions and inefficient use of resources. Egyptian Authorities may want to consider speeding up the Euro-Med schedule of liberalization to mitigate this increase in effective rates of protection. Furthermore, special effort should be made to reduce external tariffs on semi-and fully-processed goods to attenuate the expected negative effects of the rise in effective rates of protection.
More generally, to prevent the high potential for trade diversion associated with Egypt's high tariffs, a simultaneous reduction in the country's external tariffs should accompanied the EU-Egypt agreement. This will allow domestic producers to benefit from lowerpriced intermediate inputs, originating from both European and non-European sources.
This in turn will allow them to maximize their benefits from the duty free access to the European market. This type of rationale was behind recent demands by Chilean producers to cut Chile's external tariffs from its uniform level of 11 percent to 6 percent. 
I. High Dispersion
The standard deviation of Egyptian tariffs in 1999 is 127 percentage points, which indicates a high degree of dispersion in its tariff structure (the coefficient of variation is equal to 4.5). Again, this is partly influenced by the tariff peaks for alcoholic beverages; but as shown in Table 4 , there are several other sectors where the within sector coefficient of variation is above the traditional 0.5 level. These include Motor Vehicles, Sporting and Athletic goods, Electric machinery and Slaughtering. Compared to similar countries in Latin America and Asia which have successfully integrated into world markets, the degree of tariff dispersion seem to be particularly important in Egypt. 
II. Tariff escalation
The most salient feature of Egypt's tariff structure is the degree of tariff escalation, i.e., tariffs are higher for fully-processed products whereas raw materials of semi-processed products have lower tariffs. In 1999, the average tariff on products in the first-stage of processing is 14.3 percent; in the second stage 21.4 percent and in the third stage 35.6 percent.
28 Figure 1 gives the distribution of tariffs for products on the first stage of production. The distribution is skewed to the left, which suggests that most of the tariffs for products in the firststage of processing are low. The median is at 6 percent (41 percent of tariff lines for products in the first-stage of processing have a tariff around 6 percent). On the other hand Figure 2 , gives the distribution of tariffs for fully processed products, which is double peaked and has a median of 40 percent (23 percent of tariff lines of fully processed products have a tariff around 40 percent).
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Tariff escalation can be found across all Egyptian industries, with the exception of Fabricated
Metal and Machinery. Figure 3 reports the average tariffs for fully-processed, semi-processed and first-stage of processing products for the 9 industries of the ISIC 2-digit classification. All but one, have a significant degree of tariff escalation with fully processed products having a much higher tariff than first-stage of processing products. While not particular to specific industries, tariff escalation is rather significant in Textile and Leather, Wood and Wooden Furniture and Basic Metal. 28 The classification of different stages of production was calculated according to WTO filter used in Trade Policy Reviews. 29 The median for the overall tariff distribution is at 12 percent (21 percent of tariff lines). 
Annex B: Variable construction and notation
The construction of the variables used in the empirical section is discussed below. Notation to be employed is given in parenthesis and the expected signs of the exogenous variables is given in square brackets. The endogeneity problems can be important, as suggested in a study by Trefler (1993) , as most of the exogenous variables may also be functions of tariffs. Due to data restrictions, the empirical section does not deal with endogeneity problems.
• tariffs, the endogenous variable corresponds in all equations to the simple average tariff for the 81 sectors of the ISIC 4-digit classification (results with import-weighted tariffs were consistent).
• concentration index was calculated as: (output of the whole economy/number of firms in the whole economy)/(output in sector i/number of firms in sector i).
[+].
• import penetration ratio was calculated as: (imports )/(gross output).
[-].
• Level of processing was calculated as the average of the level of processing determined by WTO TPR at the 6-digit level of the Harmonized system. The WTO classification gives a value of 1 to first stage of processing goods, a value of 2 to semi-processed goods and a value of 3 to fully-processed products. Given that the average is taken for the 81 sectors of the ISIC 4-digit classification, the variable becomes continuous in the range 1-3.
[2] labor/capital ratios were calculated as: (number of employees)/(value added -labor costs).
• • wages per sector were calculated as: (labor cost)/(number of employees). (noted W).
